Despite – or perhaps because of – its status as a renegade province of China, security and defence issues in Taiwan change little from quarter to quarter. The three months ending September 2009 were no exception.

A highlight was the visit to Taiwan by the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader-in-exile of China’s Tibetan population. The Dalai Lama went to areas of the island that had been devastated by Typhoon Morakot. In Beijing, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the Chinese government noted that the Dalai Lama’s visit would likely have ‘a negative influence’ on Cross-Strait relations.

In practice, relations between Taiwan and China continue to improve – a point recognised by TAO head Wang Yi in mid-September. Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration has achieved a steady strengthening of cross-Strait links. Indeed, given the need to counter the impact on Taiwan’s exportorientated economy of the slump in trade in the wake of the global financial crisis – and the comparative economic resilience of mainland China – it could be argued that the Taiwanese government has no alternative.

In short, an invasion of Taiwan by China – which has always been a low probability scenario – is most unlikely, not least because of the economic, military and political costs that it would entail for China.

The assessment of other security challenges in Taiwan, such as crime and terrorism, has delivered one of the highest overall risk ratings in the Asia-Pacific region.

In absolute terms, Taiwan remains one of the world’s largest importers of defence-aerospace material, not least because the Ministry of National Defence is, like its peers in many other countries, seeking to streamline and modernise the military. Although US groups remain the principal suppliers, Taiwan has been diversifying its procurement sources, with the result that French and German firms regularly compete in official tenders.

The indigenous defence industry is dominated by three firms – CSIST, AIDC and CSBC – all of which suffer from financial and organisational problems. In spite of the official policy of self-reliance in defence production, foreign groups are the only suppliers that are actually able to provide Taiwan with the hightech equipment that its defence forces require.

Key issues remain the perceived inability of Taiwan’s air force to fight a war with China lasting more than two days (given the lack of munitions) and the value of various Early Warning and missile development programmes.