Jordan Defence and Security Report 2009

In what was seen as a setback for the cause of reform, in early October 2008 King Abdullah replaced Basem Awadallah, who had been his closest reform adviser, appointing instead Nasser al-Lozi, a former minister from a prominent tribal family. Awadallah, a US-educated 43-year old technocrat of Palestinian origin, had been seen as an outsider by the traditional conservative establishment. They feared he was seeking to give the monarchy wider powers and to set up a parallel administration that would interfere with the day to day running of the government. There were also concerns that on Awadallah’s advice the privatisation programme was being pushed faster and further than approved by parliament. On the political front, there were rumours that the adviser backed a plan to merge Jordan with the Palestinian West Bank, if a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians could not be achieved. Awadallah denied these claims. Officials cited by news agency AFP said that Jordan ‘strongly opposes all American or Israeli attempts to merge it with a part of the West Bank’. The conservative ‘old guard’ was seen as being particularly strong in the country’s powerful intelligence agency. King Abdullah, for his part, made his closeness to Awadallah clear in a letter accepting his resignation. The officially-released text said ‘As you leave your post… I tell you that you will always be the subject of my respect and will remain close to me as you have always been’.

Jordan continues to perform a regional diplomatic, defence, and security balancing act. Under King Abdullah the country remains an important US ally in the Middle East, quietly lobbying the US administration to coax the main regional players towards an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, which still remains a distant prospect. Alignment with Washington carries both benefits (not least over half a billion dollars in annual economic and military assistance) but also costs. Supporting the US military intervention in neighbouring Iraq has been at times a diplomatically lonely affair. It also exposed Jordan to attack from al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremists, most notably in the Amman hotel bombings of November 2005, which left scores of Jordanian dead and injured. In domestic politics the government also faces dilemmas. Minded in principle to move towards a more open political system, the King and his officials now fear that relaxation will benefit the opposition Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. As in Egypt, the government cannot make its mind up if the Brotherhood is a legitimate political movement or the thin edge of a wedge that leads to fundamentalism and sectarian violence.

Increased US military aid has supplemented Jordan’s traditionally low military expenditure. Such aid has accelerated Amman’s modernisation programme through the provision of advanced military exports to Jordan and foreign investment in its defence industry. Jordan’s indigenous defence industry provides the country’s armed forces with many of its defence requirements, and represents a respectable upgrade capability that is attracting attention across the region and increasingly into the global arena. Production aside, Jordan is a recipient of an extensive range of advanced Western military hardware.

In such a volatile region, King Abdullah is well advised to hold his current course. He must maintain good relations with the West and keep a lid on the country’s Islamists without losing the support of the Jordanian people. While in favour with the West, Jordan is likely to continue to develop its military relationship with the US. US military aid has accelerated extensive modernisation programmes, especially for the Jordanian Air Force, which would otherwise be hampered by the need to maintain low operational costs. If all continues as planned, and Jordan welcomes international investment in its defence industry, the Kingdom could be set to become a significant player in the region.